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Abstract
Image data has been greatly produced by individuals and
commercial vendors in the daily life, and it has been used
across various domains, like advertising, medical and traffic
analysis. Recently, image data also appears to be greatly im-
portant in social utility, like emergency response. However,
the privacy concern becomes the biggest obstacle that pre-
vents further exploration of image data, due to that the image
could reveal sensitive information, like the personal identity
and locations. The recent developed Local Differential Pri-
vacy (LDP) brings us a promising solution, which allows the
data owners to randomly perturb their input to provide the
plausible deniability of the data before releasing. In this pa-
per, we consider a two-party image classification problem, in
which data owners hold the image and the untrustworthy data
user would like to fit a machine learning model with these im-
ages as input. To protect the image privacy, we propose to lo-
cally perturb the image representation before revealing to the
data user. Subsequently, we analyze how the perturbation sat-
isfies -LDP and affect the data utility regarding count-based
and distance-based machine learning algorithm, and propose
a supervised image feature extractor, DCAConv, which pro-
duces an image representation with scalable domain size. Our
experiments show that DCAConv could maintain a high data
utility while preserving the privacy regarding multiple image
benchmark datasets.
Introduction
Image data has been greatly produced and shared in our
daily life, and the usage of image data has been demon-
strated through various applications, like preference anal-
ysis and advertising(Leon et al. 2012), medical (Xia et al.
2016) and traffic(Chan, Liang, and Vasconcelos 2008) anal-
ysis. Lately, image data becomes greatly important in so-
cial utility(Lepinski et al. 2015) as well, like emergency re-
sponse. For example, in the Boston Marathon bombing, the
authorities spent lots of effort to gather onsite photos from
people in that area, and pore through thousands of photos to
search for the suspects. However, the privacy concern comes
to be the biggest obstacle that prevents people sharing this
information, since the image may reveal where they are and
what they are doing. Thus, exploring the privacy preserving
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machine learning technique with regard to image data be-
comes paramount importance.
In this paper, we study an image classification problem,
in which there are two parties(Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath
2014), the image owners, who hold a set of images; the un-
trustworthy data user, who would like to fit a machine learn-
ing model regarding these images. As an example, in the
Marathon bombing case, the authorities serves as the data
user, who asks for the onsite images to search for the sus-
pects, and the people that provided the images serve as the
data owner, who wishes to support the investigation while
preserving the privacy. During the last decade, Differential
Privacy (Dwork 2006) is one of the most popular schemes
for privacy protection, which prevents the inference about
individuals from participation of computation. It defines a
mechanism that the computation of the data is robust to
any change of any individual sample by introducing uncer-
tainty into the algorithm. Recently, Local Differential Pri-
vacy(LDP)(Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright 2013)(Wang et
al. 2017) extends the technique into a local setting, which
provides a stronger privacy protection that allows data own-
ers to perturb their input before releasing.
Differentially private machine learning in the local set-
ting has been rarely studied. Recently, (Nguyeˆn et al. 2016)
and (Pihur et al. 2018) investigate the privacy-preserving
distributed machine learning, in both work, the data owners
interactively work with the data user to learn the model. Un-
like these previous work, a “non-interactive” manner draws
much of our interest that the data owners only perturb once
and then share the data with the data user. Comparing to
the interactive setting, the non-interactive way is more scal-
able and needs less communication cost. Randomized re-
sponse(Warner 1965) is proposed to provide the plausible
deniability for individuals responding to sensitive surveys.
It has been proved that this mechanism satisfies -LDP and
is universally optimal for mutual information optimization
problem(Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath 2014), which provides
a solid foundation for its usage in the area of machine learn-
ing. In this paper, we are interested in adopting randomized
response to locally perturb the input and fit the count-based
and distance-based machine learning models with such in-
put. Specifically, we study the utility and privacy trade-off
with respect to the Naive Bayes and KNN classifiers and
show how the model utility is affected by the privacy pa-
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rameters. Furthermore, in terms of image classification, we
propose the DCAConv, a supervised image feature extractor,
that improves the utility under the -LDP.
Overall, the contributions of our work are three folds:
• We propose to use the LDP in the privacy preserving im-
age classification problem. To the best of our knowledge,
most LDP-based work focus on the frequency estimation
of the categorical data, and we are the first to investigate
the privacy preserving mechanism to fit the image data in
the classification problem.
• We analyze the utility and privacy trade-off regarding
count-based and distance-based machine learning mod-
els, i.e. Naive Bayes and KNN classifiers. As a result, we
show how the model utility is affected by the privacy pa-
rameters.
• We develop the DCAConv, a supervised image feature ex-
tractor, which represents the image with a scalable do-
main size. DCAConv is evaluated in terms of image clas-
sification through multiple benchmark datasets, like tex-
ture and facial datasets. The results confirm that DCA-
Conv could maintain a high data utility while preserving
the privacy.
The rest of paper is organized as follow. The preliminary
is in Section II. The problem definition and proposed solu-
tion is introduced in Section III. We describe DCAConv, the
supervised image feature extractor in Section IV. The ex-
periment and evaluation is in Section V. The related work
is presented in Section VI. Section VII presents the conclu-
sion.
Preliminary
Local Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) ensures that an adversary should
not be able to reliably infer any individual sample from the
computation of a dataset, even with unbounded computa-
tional power and access to every other samples. Given two
data databaseA,A′, it is said thatA,A′ are neighbors if they
differs on at most one row. The formal definition of a (, δ)-
differential private mechanism over A is defined below:
Definition 1 (, δ)-differential privacy(Dwork 2006;
Dwork et al. 2014): A randomized mechanism F is (, δ)-
differentially private if for every two neighboring database
A,A′ and for any O ⊆ Range(F),
Pr[F(A) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[F(A′) ∈ O] + δ (1)
where Pr[·] denotes the probability of an event,
Range(F) denotes the set of all possible outputs of the al-
gorithm F . The smaller , δ are, the closer Pr[F(A) ∈ O]
and Pr[F(A′) ∈ O] are, and the stronger privacy protec-
tion gains. When δ = 0, the mechanism F is -differentially
private, which is a stronger privacy guarantee than , δ-
differential privacy with δ > 0.
Similar to DP, a stronger setting of local privacy is in-
vestigated by Duchi et al. (Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright
2013), namely Local Differential Privacy. It considers a sce-
nario that a data curator needs to collect data from data own-
ers, and infer the statistical information from these data. The
data owner is assumed to trust no one, and would perturb the
data before sharing with data curator. The formal definition
is given below:
Definition 2 -Local Differential Privacy(Duchi, Jordan,
and Wainwright 2013; Wang et al. 2017): A randomized
mechanism G satisfies -Local Differential Privacy (-LDP)
if for any input v1 and v2 and for any S ⊆ Range(G):
Pr[G(v1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[G(v2) ∈ S] (2)
Comparing to DP, LDP provides a stronger privacy model,
while entails more noise.
Randomized Response
Randomized Response(Warner 1965) is a decades-old tech-
nique which is designed to collect the statistical information
regarding sensitive survey questions. The original technique
is used for frequency estimation of a particular input. For
social research, the interviewee is asked to provide an an-
swer regarding the sensitive question, such as marijuana us-
age. To protect the privacy, the interviewee is asked to spin a
spinner unobserved by the interviewer. Rather than answer-
ing the sensitive question directly, the interviewee only tells
yes or no according to whether the spinner points to the true
answer. Suppose that the interviewer wants to estimate the
population of using marijuana and asks the interviewee if
he has ever used the marijuana. And the probability that the
spinner points to yes is p, then the spinner points to no is
with probability 1 − p. Thus an unbiased maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the true population proportion is given by
p−1
2p−1 +
n1
(2p−1)n , where n is the number of participating in-
terviewees and n1 is the amount of reporting yes. It(Wang et
al. 2016) shows that this mechanism satisfies (ln p1−p )-LDP.
Randomized response could also be generalized to multi-
ple choices, where the domain of the choices is [d], d > 2.
Suppose the randomized method is G,∀v, s ∈ [d], the per-
turbation is defined below:
Pr[G(v) = s] =
{
p = e

d−1+e , if v = s
q = 1−pd−1 =
1
d−1+e , if v 6= s
(3)
Proof. (Wang et al. 2017) For any inputs v1 and v2 and out-
put s:
G(v1) = s
G(v2) = s ≤
p
q
= e (4)
In terms of maintaining the original statistical informa-
tion, even though (Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath 2014) proves
that randomized response is universally optimal for mutual
information and f -divergences optimization, there’s no clear
guide about how to employ this mechanism in particular ma-
chine learning algorithm.
Discriminant Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis is a well known tool for un-
supervised learning which finds the subspace that preserves
the most variance of the original data, however, it is not ef-
fective in the supervised learning since the labeling informa-
tion is ignored in the computation. Discriminant Component
Analysis (DCA)(Kung 2017), basically a supervised PCA, is
proposed recently as a complement for supervised learning,
where the signal subspace components of DCA are associ-
ated with the discriminant power regarding the classification
effectiveness while the noise subspace components of DCA
are tightly coupled with the recoverability. Since the rank of
the signal subspace is limited by the number of classes, DCA
is capable to support classification using a small number of
components.
Consider aK-class data set consisting ofN samplesX =
[x1, x2, . . . , xn]
T , in which xi ∈ Rm. Each sample xi asso-
ciates with a class label yi where yi ∈ {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}.
Let µ denotes the centroid of the total mass, µk denotes
the centroid of the samples in class Ck, and Nk denotes the
number of samples in class Ck. The signal matrix is repre-
sented by the between-class scatter matrix:
SB =
K∑
k=1
Nk(µk − µ)(µk − µ)T (5)
The noise matrix is characterized by the following within-
class scatter matrix:
SW =
K∑
k=1
∑
i:yi=Ck
(xi − µk)(xi − µk)T (6)
The total scatter matrix S¯ can be written as follows:
S¯ = SB + SW (7)
In DCA, two ridge parameters ρ and ρ′ are incorporated in
the noise matrix SW and the signal matrix SB as follows:
S′B = SB + ρ
′I (8) S′W = SW + ρI (9)
where I is the identity matrix. Therefore, the regulated
scatter matrix is denoted as:
S¯′ = S′B + S
′
W = S¯ + (ρ+ ρ
′)I (10)
DCA performs spectral decomposition of the pre-whitened
scatter matrix, DDCA:
DDCA = (S
′
W )
−1S¯′ = UΛUT (11)
where Λ holds the the monotonically decreasing eigenval-
ues, and U holds the associated eigenvectors. To form a
projection matrix, it chooses k eigenvectors with the largest
eigenvalues to form a projection matrix Wdca ∈ Rm×k, in
which each column is an eigenvector. And the raw data is
transformed by multiplying the projection matrix:
Xproj = X ×Wdca (12)
X1
X2 
Data Owner O1
Data Owner O2
Data Owner On
Xn 
Data User
X11 X12 X1m
Figure 1: Problem Overview. An image held
by Data Owner Oi is represented as a vector
xi = {xi1, xi2, . . . , xim}, xij ∈ [d], each vector asso-
ciates with a label yi, the Data User would like to fit a
classifier with such vectors from all n Data Owners. To
protect the privacy of xi, a perturbation is required to satisfy
j-LDP for the jth feature.
Problem Definition and Solution Analysis
Problem Definition
As Fig.1 shows, in this paper, we consider the following
problem: Given n Data Owners, each Data Owner Oi holds
a set of images that are represented as am-dimensional fea-
ture vectors. For ease of analysis, here it is assume that
only one image is possessed by Oi and it is denoted as
xi = {xi1, xi2, . . . , xim}, xij ∈ [d]. Each image xi as-
sociates with a label yi, for instance, the images held by
each data owner is about the handwritten digit, and yi indi-
cates the corresponding digit of xi; the untrustworthy Data
User would like to fit an image classifier with xi, yi, i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} as input while satisfying j-LDP for the jth
feature of xi. It should be noted that the images held by
each data owner are perturbed independently, so there are
no difference to perturb a set of images or a single image
at Oi. With respect to image classification, the effective-
ness of both Naive Bayes and KNN classifiers have been
demonstrated through previous work(Boiman, Shechtman,
and Irani 2008; McCann and Lowe 2012), which are studied
in this work.
For the threat model, the adversary is intended to learn
individual image xi, who could be either the untrustworthy
data user, a participating data owner or an outside attacker.
It assumes that adversaries might have arbitrary background
knowledge and there might be a collusion among them. The
goal is maintain the data utility in terms of image classifica-
tion while protecting the data privacy.
Frequency and Mean Estimation
In this paper, we mainly investigate to use Randomized Re-
sponse to satisfy ij-LDP for xij , which is perturbed in-
dependently. Given a xi, yi, we assume that the class label
yi ∈ {C1, C2, . . . , Ck} and x′i is the vector after perturba-
tion. Firstly, we show how to build the Naive Bayes classifier
by leveraging the aggregation result of the perturbed input.
In our problem, for each training data xi, xij is indepen-
dently perturbed by randomized response atOi and x′i is sent
to the Data User. And the frequency of each appeared value
v is served as the building block of the classifier training,
more specifically, the frequency of value v in the jth feature
that belongs to Ck should be counted, in which is denoted
as cj(v). However, due to the noise injected by randomized
response, the observation doesn’t reflect the true proportion
of value v. Thus given the number of observation of v in the
jth feature, denoted as
∑
j v, cj(v) is estimated as(Wang et
al. 2017):
ˆcj(v) =
∑
j v − nqj
pj − qj (13)
=
∑
j v − n(1− pj)/(d− 1)
pj − (1− pj)/(d− 1) (14)
where pj = Pr[x′ij = v], if xij = v, which refers to
Equ.3, and n is the number of observations that in Ck. It
can be further shown that ˆcj(v) is an unbiased estimator.
Assuming fv,j is the true proportion that value v occurs in
jth feature, E[ ˆcj(v)] would be:
E[ ˆcj(v)] = E[
∑
j v − nqj
pj − qj ] (15)
=
nfv,jpj + n(1− fv,j)qj − nqj
pj − qj (16)
= nfv,j (17)
And V ar[ ˆcj(v)] is given as below:
V ar[ ˆcj(v)] =
nqj(1− qj)
(pj − qj)2 +
nfv,j(1− pj − qj)
pj − qj (18)
= n(
d− 2 + ej
(ej − 1)2 +
fv,j(d− 2)
ej − 1 ) (19)
where V ar[ ˆcj(v)] is in O(nde ). Furthermore, µˆj is the es-
timated mean of feature j given the frequency estimation of
each appeared value:
µˆj =
∑
v v
ˆcj(v)
n
(20)
Correspondingly, E[µˆj ] and V ar[µˆj ] are computed as fol-
low:
E[µˆj ] = E[
∑
v v
ˆcj(v)
n
] (21)
=
E[
∑
v v
ˆcj(v)]
n
(22)
=
∑
v vE[
ˆcj(v)]
n
(23)
=
∑
v
vfv,j (24)
V ar[µˆj ] = V ar[
∑
v v
ˆcj(v)
n
] (25)
=
V ar[
∑
v v
ˆcj(v)]
n2
(26)
=
∑
v v
2V ar[ ˆcj(v)]
n2
(27)
It can be seen that µˆj is an unbiased estimator and
V ar[µˆj ] is in O( dne ). And the Mean-Squared-Error (MSE)
of µˆj is equal to V ar[µˆj ]. In practical, the unbiased estima-
tor for the sum of counts is adopted, which is
∑
v
ˆcj(v) and
it results in the same order of MSE.
A different mean estimator is given by replacing the de-
nominator n with the corrected sum of frequencies, where
µˆrrj :
µˆrrj =
∑
v v
ˆcj(v)∑
v
ˆcj(v)
(28)
Correspondingly, by using multivariate Taylor expansions,
E[µˆrrj ] and V ar[µˆ
rr
j ] are computed as follow:
E[X] = E[
∑
v
v ˆcj(v)] =
∑
v
E[v ˆcj(v)] =
∑
v
vE[ ˆcj(v)] ≤ nd2
(29)
var[X] = var[
∑
v
v ˆcj(v)] =
∑
v
var[v ˆcj(v)] =
∑
v
v2var[ ˆcj(v)]
(30)
E[Y ] = E[
∑
v
ˆcj(v)] =
∑
v
E[ ˆcj(v)] = n (31)
var[Y ] = var[
∑
v
ˆcj(v)] =
∑
v
var[ ˆcj(v)] = nd(
d− 2 + ej
(ej − 1)2 )
(32)
E[
X
Y
] ≈ E[X]
E[Y ]
− cov[X,Y ]
E[Y ]2
+
E[X]
E[Y ]3
var[Y ] (33)
≈ E[X]E[Y ]
2
E[Y ]3
− cov[X,Y ]E[Y ]
E[Y ]3
+
E[X]var[Y ]
E[Y ]3
(34)
≈ E[X]E[Y ]
2 − cov[X,Y ]E[Y ] + E[X]var[Y ]
E[Y ]3
(35)
≤
n3d2 − ncov[X,Y ] + n2d3 d−2+ej
(ej−1)2
n3
(36)
var[
X
Y
] ≈ var[X]
E[Y ]2
− 2E[X]
E[Y ]3
cov[X,Y ] +
E[X]2
E[Y ]4
var[Y ]
(37)
≈ var[X]E[Y ]
2
E[Y ]4
− 2E[X]E[Y ]cov[X,Y ]
E[Y ]4
+
E[X]2var[Y ]
E[Y ]4
(38)
≈ var[X]E[Y ]
2 − 2E[X]E[Y ]cov[X,Y ] + E[X]2var[Y ]
E[Y ]4
(39)
cov[X,Y ] = E[XY ]− E[X]E[Y ] (40)
MSE[
X
Y
] = V ar[
X
Y
] + (E[
X
Y
]− X
Y
)2 (41)
Nearest Centroid-Based Classifier
The Nearest Centroid Classifier (NCC) is a classification
model that assigns to testing data the label of the class
of training data whose mean is closest to the observation
in terms of certain distance metrics. Given training data
xi, yi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the per-class centroid is computed
as follows:
µk =
1
Nk
∑
i:yi=Ck
xi (42)
where Nk is the number of training data that belonging to
class Ck. For a testing data xt, the predicted class is given
by,
yˆt = argmin
k
`p(xt, µk) (43)
where `(·) is the p-norm distance between xt and µk. To
build the NCC from the perturbed data, the estimated cen-
troid is adopted:
µˆk =
∑
v∈Ck v
ˆcj(v)
Nk
(44)
DCAConv - Supervised Image Feature
Extraction
As analyzed in previous section, for both Naive Bayes and
KNN classifiers, we show that the domain size of the in-
put determines the utility gain regarding the perturbation of
randomized response. For Naive Bayes, the utility can be
measured by the variance of the estimated frequency. For
KNN classifier, the utility is measured by the probability of
preserving the true proximity between the testing data points
and the perturbed training points. In terms of randomized re-
sponse, it is readily to see that the utility gain is maximized
when domain size d = 2. However, the binary format limits
the transited information, especially for the image data. On
the other hand, increasing d asks for more price to pay with
respect to privacy. Thus the domain size d is the very key
factor for the trade-off between the utility and privacy.
For image data, the naive way to protect the privacy is
to apply randomized response to the pixel feature, neverthe-
less the utility is severely damaged due to the large domain
size. Thus the challenge is to find a proper representation of
the image data. On one hand, the representation should pre-
serve as much information as possible; on the other hand,
the domain size should provide a balance between the util-
ity and privacy. The success of CNN(Krizhevsky, Sutskever,
and Hinton 2012) on image classification draws much at-
tention in the last decade, which transforms the image into
multiple level representations by extracting the abstract se-
mantics. However, it is hard to apply randomized response to
the CNN directly, the reason is that CNN usually needs con-
tinuous number in the data flow. Furthermore, it also relies
on either Softmax or Sigmoid layer to determine the final
output distribution, where the model is trained to optimize
for specific loss functions. Inspired by PCANet(Chan et al.
2015), we are interested in designing a mechanism to trans-
form the image to a representation that has a scalable domain
size. In the meanwhile, the domain size could be as small
as possible to narrow the impact of randomized response in
terms of utility. The outcome is DCAConv, as Fig. 2 shows,
which consists of the convolution layer, the binary quanti-
zation layer and the pooling layer. The convolution filter is
computed using DCA and the generated discriminant com-
ponents serve as the filter. The quantization layer converts
the output of convolution operation to binary bits. Finally,
images are represented with the mapping of the binary bits
and passed through the pooling layer. The details are pre-
sented below:
DCA Convolution Layer
Suppose there are N images {Ei}Ni=1, each image has the
same size h × w, the patch size is kh × kw, the number
of filters in the rth convolution layer is Lr. Ei is denoted
as [ei1, ei2, . . . , eih˜w˜], and eij ∈ Rkh×kw denotes the jth
vectorized patch in Ei, where h˜ = (h−kh+2z)/t+1, w˜ =
(w−kw+2z)/t+1, and t is the size of stride, z is the the size
of zero padding. Additionally, assuming there areK classes,
each image Ei associates with a class label yi where yi ∈
{C1, C2, . . . , Ck}, and each class Ck contains Nk images.
For the first convolution layer, the overall patch mean µ and
within class patch mean µk is calculated as below:
µ =
∑N
i=1
∑h˜w˜
j=1 eij
N
(45)
µk =
∑N
i∈Ck
∑h˜w˜
j=1 eij
Nk
(46)
Then the between-class scatter matrix SB , the within class
scatter matrix SW and regularized scatter matrix are calcu-
1st Layer DCA Filter  
Convolution Mapping 
Binary Quantization 
(Heaviside Step)
Ei*W11
Ei*W12
Ei*W1L1
Ei 
H(Ei1*W21) 
H(Ei1*W22) 
H(Ei1*W2L2) 
Ti1 
Ei1*W21
Ei1*W22
Ei1*W2L2
EiL1*W21
EiL1*W22
EiL1*W2L2
....
H(EiL1*W21) 
H(EiL1*W22) 
H(EiL1*W2L2) 
TiL1 
....
Ti2 
2nd Layer DCA Filter  
Convolution
Figure 2: DCAConv: Supervised Image Feature Extractor
lated as below:
SB =
K∑
k=1
Nk(µk − µ)(µk − µ)T (47)
SW =
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Ck
(Ei − µk)(Ei − µk)T (48)
S¯′ = S′B + S
′
W = SB + ρ
′I+ SW + ρI (49)
Once getting SW and S¯′, DCA is performed over the patches
and compute a set of discriminant components as the or-
thonormal filters, where:
(S′W )
−1S¯′ = UΛUT (50)
where U holds the associated eigenvectors. The leading
eigenvectors capture the main discriminant power of the
mean-removed training patches. Then the first L1 eigenvec-
tors are taken as the orthonormal filters, where the lth filter is
represented as W l1 ∈ Rkh×kw , in the first convolution layer.
Similar to CNN, multiple convolution layers could be
stacked following the first layer, as Fig. 2 shows. Given a
second convolution layer as example, it repeats the similar
procedure as in the first one. Given the l1th filter in the first
layer, for image Ei:
El1i = Ei ∗W l11 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, l1 = 1, 2, . . . , L1 (51)
where ∗ denotes the 2D convolution. It could use zero
padding on El1i to make it has the same size as Ei. After
that, the patch mean of El1i is removed, then it performs
DCA over the concatenated patches and computes the fil-
ters for the second convolution layer. Once DCA is finished,
the first L2 eigenvectors are taken as the filters, the lth fil-
ter in the second layer is represented as W l2,W
l
2 ∈ Rkh×kw .
For each El1i , there are L2 filters to be convolved, as Fig. 2
shows.
Binary Quantization
After second convolution layer, there are L1 × L2 output in
total, and they are converted to binary representation using
the Heaviside step function H(·):
H(x) =
{
0, x ≤ 0
1, x > 0
(52)
where x = El1i ∗W l22 , l1 = 1, 2, . . . , L1, l2 = 1, 2, . . . , L2.
Mapping
Once the output of the second convolution layer is converted
to binary, for El1i , it obtains {H(El1i ∗W l22 )}L2l2=1, which is
a vector of L2 binary bits. Since El1i has the same size as
Ei with zero padding, for each pixel, the vector of L2 binary
bits is viewed as a decimal number of L2 digits. It “maps”
the output back into a single integer:
T l1i =
L2∑
l2=1
2l2−1H(El1i ∗W l22 ) (53)
Max Pooling
The output of the binary quantization layer are L1 “images”
with each “pixel” of L2 digits. To further reduce the size of
the representation, for T l1i , a max pooling layer is applied
after the binary quantization layer.
Perturbation
The randomized response is applied to the output of the
pooling layer, and the domain size d is determined by L2,
where d = 2L2 . As we mentioned early, in DCA, the rank
of the signal space is limited by the number of classes. More
specially, Lr ≤ K, where Lr is the number of filters in rth
convolution layer and K is the number of classes. By em-
ploying DCA in the design, the domain of the final output is
scalable, moreover, DCA also guarantees a high utility with
a small number of components.
Experiment
We evaluate DCAConv over three popular benchmark image
datasets, the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST1, YaleB2.
The MNIST dataset contains 28 × 28 grayscale images
of handwritten digits that from 0 to 9, in which there are
60,000 samples for training and 10,000 samples for testing.
The Fashion-MNIST dataset contains the grayscale ar-
ticle images that each sample associates with a label from
10 classes. The dataset is intended to replace the overused
MNIST dataset, and shares the same image size and struc-
ture of training and testing splits.
The YaleB face dataset contains grayscale photos of 27
subjects and each one has 594 in average, we select samples
based on the light condition and the head position, which re-
sults in around 250 samples per subject. The face is extracted
and scaled to 70 × 70.
To study the utility and privacy trade-off in terms of the
domain size d and privacy parameter , we apply randomized
response to multiple image representations, like raw pixel
and Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG), the perturbed
input is then used to fit the Naive Bayes and KNN classi-
fiers. For DCAConv, the domain size is altered by choosing
different number of filters in the last convolution layer and
the classification result demonstrates the effectiveness of the
DCAConv over other image feature representations. All ex-
periments are repeated 10 times, the mean and standard de-
viation of the classification accuracy are drawn in figures.
DCAConv vs Pixel vs HOG
We first measure the classification accuracy with three image
representations, the raw pixel, DCAConv and HOG, where
a Bag of Visual Words (BOVW) model is associated with
the HOG descriptor. More specifically, HOG descriptor pro-
vides a fixed length of the image representation, while each
feature is contrast-normalized to improve the accuracy. Once
the descriptor is generated, a K-Means clustering is per-
formed over the whole descriptors and the center of each
cluster is used as the visual dictionarys vocabularies. Finally,
the frequency histogram is made from the visual vocabular-
ies and is served as BOVW. Unlike DCAConv, the domain
size of the BOVW is fixed once the number of clusters is
determined and there is no significant difference observed
after tuning the number of clusters. In the experiment, the
domain size of the BOVW is determined by the maximum
frequency observed among all features, e.g. MNIST has a
domain size of 40, Fashion-MNIST has a size of 39 and
YaleB has a size of 44, otherwise, the probability of answer-
ing honestly would be uneven among all features. For DCA-
Cov, there are two convolution layers and various number of
L2 filters is tested. To make a fair comparison, the raw pixel
is downscaled to have the same size as the DCAConv output
domain. For example, the raw pixel value is downscaled to
[0,15] using a MinMaxScaler3 to match the DCAConv with
1https://github.com/zalandoresearch/fashion-mnist
2vision.ucsd.edu/ iskwak/ExtYaleDatabase/ExtYaleB.html
3http://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/
sklearn.preprocessing.MinMaxScaler.html
4 L2 filters. For the information loss caused by the down-
scaling, we don’t observe a significant degrading in terms
of the classification accuracy. Fig. 3 displays the accuracy
regarding Naive Bayes and KNN classifiers, the horizontal
specifies the  for each individual feature, and the vertical
axis shows the classification accuracy.
From the figure, it could be seen that, both classifiers per-
form slightly better than random guessing when  ≤ 0.01,
and the accuracy increases as  ≥ 0.1. When  grows to
1.0, for DCAConv and raw pixel, both classifiers provide
reasonably good accuracy, however, the BOVW still suffers
from a low accuracy as the domain size is much larger than
the other two representations. Tab. 1 provides the KNN ac-
curacy of DCAConv when  ≥ 0.1, where the last column
gives the ground truth as no randomized response applied.
As analyzed in Section III, the probability of being the true
`2 distance is bigger than 12 as  ≥ ln(d+1), and it confirms
that the accuracy approximates to the ground truth given that
, e.g. for all 3 datasets, the accuracy is within 5% of the
ground truth as  ≥ 2.83. The comparison between Naive
Bayes and KNN classifiers shows that Naive Bayes achieves
higher accuracy when  ≤ 1.0, where it may due to that
the noise is eliminated by the frequency estimator, but the
KNN still suffers to a low probability to preserve the true
proximity of the data points given the same . However, as 
increases, the perturbation becomes less, and the KNN starts
to dominate classification accuracy.
Finally, for the texture dataset, the downscaled pixel fea-
ture provides a compatible accuracy with DCAConv. How-
ever, for the more complicated data, like facial data, the pixel
fails to provide a good discriminant capacity in the KNN al-
gorithm; under the same , BOVW performs worse than the
other two representations due to the large domain size.
DCAConv vs BNN
We evaluate DCAConv under an extreme case, where the
output is set to binary, and compare the utility of the rep-
resentation to a variant of CNN. As we mention early, the
reason that it is hard to apply randomized response to CNN
is that the data flow is continuous. However, there are stud-
ies to replace the weights and activation with discrete val-
ues for the purpose of improving the power-efficiency. Bi-
narized Neural Network (BNN)(Courbariaux et al. 2016) is
one of such research work, which modifies the convolution
layer and activation function, to transform the data flow from
float number to {+1,−1}. For the implementation of BNN,
we take the suggested values for parameters like the num-
ber of hidden units in the fully connected layer, but with
the same convolution layer setting as DCAConv, like the
same number of filters. Once the training of BNN is fin-
ished, we take the activated binarized output before the fully
connected layer and perturb it using randomized response.
The classification result is shown in Fig 4, where the verti-
cal axis specifies the classification accuracy. With the binary
representation, the probability of preserving the true prox-
imity quickly dominates as  ≥ 1.1, and the performance
of the perturbed data almost reaches the ground truth. Sim-
ilarly, Tab. 2 provides the Naive Bayes and KNN accuracy
of DCAConv when  ≥ 0.1, where the domain size d = 2,
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Figure 3: Comparison of DCAConv, pixel feature and BOVW, DCA KNN represents the classification result of DCAConv in
KNN, RAW KNN represents the classification result of pixel feature in KNN, BOVW KNN represents the classification result
of the BOVW in KNN. For DCAConv and pixel feature, the output domain d=16. For BOVW, MNIST has d = 40, Fashion-
MNIST has d = 39 and YaleB has d = 44. DCAConv hyper-parameters, filter size: 7×7, filter stride size: 1×1, L1:5, L2:4,
pooling window size: 2×2, pooling stride size: 1×1.
dataset
 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 ∞
Naive Bayes
MNIST 77.52 86.35 87.15 87.19 87.07 86.97 86.92 86.92 86.90 86.90
Fashion-MNIST 58.96 68.27 68.71 68.88 68.89 68.94 68.94 68.90 68.90 68.80
YaleB 10.52 44.27 68.29 75.32 78.89 79.43 80.63 80.70 81.32 81.71
KNN
MNIST 24.72 68.92 81.96 86.05 88.00 89.37 89.95 90.27 90.46 90.50
Fashion-MNIST 20.56 48.58 57.35 63.40 68.21 71.54 74.14 75.64 76.73 78.70
YaleB 6.01 49.56 90.76 95.18 95.88 95.91 95.88 95.77 95.77 95.92
Table 1: Classification accuracy (%) with DCAConv, where d = 16 and ln(d+ 1) ≈ 2.83. The last column provides the ground
truth as no randomized response applied. Due to the space limit, the standard deviation of the measured accuracy is omitted
here.
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Figure 4: Comparison of DCAConv and BNN, DCA KNN represents result of DCAConv output in KNN algorithm, BNN KNN
represents result of BNN output in KNN algorithm, output domain d=2, number of neighbors in KNN: 100. DCAConv hyper-
parameters, filter size: 7×7, filter stride size: 1×1, L1: 5, L2: 1, pooling window size: 2×2, pooling stride size: 1×1.
it can be seen that the classification accuracy of KNN al-
most matches the ground truth regarding all 3 datasets when
 ≥ 1.5. However, unlike KNN, there is not a clear threshold
of  for Naive Bayes classifier to provide a utility guarantee.
Related Work
Image privacy has been studied widely. Privacy-aware im-
age classification has been addressed in (Zerr et al. 2012)
and (Spyromitros-Xioufis et al. 2016), where they are inter-
ested in determining if an image has privacy-related con-
tent or not. By exploring the “public/private” tags provided
dataset
 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 ∞
Naive Bayes
MNIST 76.38 77.30 77.21 77.10 77.04 76.96 76.91 76.89 76.83 76.60
Fashion-MNIST 58.96 68.27 68.71 68.88 68.89 68.94 68.94 68.90 68.90 68.80
YaleB 24.01 44.76 43.94 43.38 43.16 42.91 42.86 42.74 42.74 42.74
KNN
MNIST 65.96 85.25 88.27 89.21 89.69 89.95 90.04 90.19 90.24 90.20
Fashion-MNIST 69.66 70.90 70.62 70.52 70.43 70.39 70.39 70.37 70.32 70.30
YaleB 79.33 95.50 95.35 95.46 95.58 95.55 95.61 95.66 95.75 95.80
Table 2: Classification accuracy (%) with DCAConv, where d = 2 and ln(d+ 1) ≈ 1.10. The last column provides the ground
truth as no randomized response applied. Due to the space limit, the standard deviation of the measured accuracy is omitted
here.
by the end users, they trained a privacy classifier to help
the end users make decisions in the context of image shar-
ing. A privacy-preserving image feature extraction system is
proposed in (Qin et al. 2014), namely SecSIFT, which al-
lows the user to delegate the SIFT feature extraction to the
cloud computing platform. In the design, the image own-
ers encrypt the image, then upload the encrypted data to the
Cloud. And the computation is distributed to multiple in-
dependent Cloud entities, who are not colluding with each
other. Once the feature extraction is finished, the encrypted
feature descriptors are returned to the image owners. The
authors argue that both the plaintext data and the locations
of feature points of the image are not leaked to the Cloud.
To the best of our knowledge, the most similar work to this
paper is (Erkin et al. 2009), a privacy-enhanced face recog-
nition system. They consider a two party problem, the server
owns a database of face images, and the client who holds a
facial image. The protocol they propose allows the client ef-
ficiently hiding both the biometrics and the result from the
server that performs the matching operation by using secure
multiparty computation technique. The difference from our
work is that it is a centralized setting where the data has al-
ready been collected in the server. However, the technique
(e.g, without adding noise for differential privacy) provides
inadequate privacy protection.
LDP is firstly proposed by (Duchi, Jordan, and Wain-
wright 2013), in where the minimax bounds for learn-
ing problem is derived under the local privacy definition.
Kairouz et al. (Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath 2014) study the
trade-off between the utility and LDP in terms of family of
extremal mechanisms. Although two simple extremal mech-
anisms, the binary and randomized response mechanisms,
are proposed and shown the theoretical guarantee of the util-
ity, it is still hard to adopt the methods in real world machine
learning problems. Wang et al. (Wang et al. 2017) propose a
framework that generalizes several LDP protocols in the lit-
erature and analyzes each one regarding frequency estima-
tion. For the real world application, RAPPOR(Erlingsson,
Pihur, and Korolova 2014) is the first that practically adopts
LDP to collect the statistics from the end users, which is de-
signed by Google. Apple and Microsoft also propose their
own tools to use LDP in collecting usage, typing history and
telemetry data(Ding, Kulkarni, and Yekhanin 2017).
Recently, an iterative method(Nguyeˆn et al. 2016) that sat-
isfies -LDP is proposed for empirical risk minimization,
where each data owner locally computes and perturbs the
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) of the parameters, then
shares the noisy version of SGD to the aggregator. In the
paper, the authors demonstrate the computation with three
models, the linear regression, logistic regression and SVM.
Another client-server machine learning framework is pro-
posed to learn the Generalized Linear models(Pihur et al.
2018), where the server simultaneous delivers the models
to the distributed clients and asks for the parameter update.
More specifically, the server maintains k versions of the ma-
chine learning model, and randomly selects one version to
update the parameters and replaces the another version. To
enforce the -LDP, the client uses Laplacian mechanism to
perturb the parameters and returns the model to the server.
Unlike both works, we consider a “non-interactive” scenario
where the data owners only perturb the input once and then
share the noisy input with the data user. Comparing to the in-
teractive fashion, the non-interactive way requires less com-
munication cost and brings a great scalability. Overall, most
current studies regarding LDP either focus on the theoretical
interest of the perturbation methods or on simple statistical
collection, like mean and frequency estimation. There are
few studies regarding machine learning in a local setting.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study a privacy-preserving image classi-
fication problem, where the distributed data owners hold a
set of images; the untrustworthy data user would like to fit a
classifier regarding the images held by the owners. To pro-
tect the privacy, we propose to use randomized response to
perturb the image representation locally, which satisfies -
Local Differential Privacy. We address two questions in this
paper, firstly, we analyze the utility and privacy trade-off re-
garding the domain size d and parameter  for Naive Bayes
and KNN classifier. For Naive Bayes classifier, the utility is
bounded by the frequency estimation of the individual fea-
ture; for KNN, we show that the probability of retaining the
true proximity between the testing sample and the perturbed
training sample is bigger than 12 as  ≥ ln(d+ 1); secondly,
to balance the trade-off between the utility and privacy, we
propose a supervised image feature extractor, namely DCA-
Conv, which produces a representation of the image with
a scalable domain size. The experiments over three bench-
mark image datasets evaluates the classification accuracy of
the perturbed image representations with respect to Naive
Bayes and KNN algorithm, which confirms our analysis re-
garding the domain size and  and shows that the effective-
ness of DCAConv under various privacy constraints.
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